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COMMENTARIES
THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW IN TEACHING
AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDUREf
SIDNEY B. JACOBY*
T HE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW CAN enhance the teaching of Ameri-
can civil procedure, especially by a comparison of foreign formbook
material with American forms.' In this way, with some basic knowledge
of comparative civil procedure, the student will better appreciate our own
concepts and will also understand some fundamental principles of the
civil procedure of civil law countries when he is confronted with them
in private practice.
A comparison of common law and civil law systems will highlight
one central distinguishing characteristic upon which the respective sys-
tems of procedure build. American civil procedure is based upon the ad-
versary system, while the procedure of civil law countries is not. Thus,
in federal courts under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in other
jurisdictions which have adopted systems like the Federal Rules, plead-
ing serves only the general purpose of giving notice and not of elucidat-
ing facts. 2 The parties then may bring out the facts by an extensive
use of discovery methods: depositions, written questions, interrogatories,
admissions, and physical examinations. The use of official and non-of-
ficial forms in our system will demonstrate the resulting brevity of our
pleadings. On the other hand, in the civil law investigatory systems,
the pleadings, which are greater in length, provide the court with de-
tailed relevant facts so that the court itself can exercise its statutory
function of investigating the case by taking the necessary evidence. Prac-
tical examples of this investigatory method will highlight our opposite
method.
A comparison of different civil procedure systems will illuminate cer-
tain specific applications of these general principles. Thus, we follow
the rules that parties need not plead evidence, that parties should plead
averments concisely, and that parties should avoid argumentative de-
f A brief resume of this Commentary was given as a speech at the 1976 Annual
Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools in Houston, Texas (Section of
Comparative Law). The valuable assistance of Gary L. Gross, J.D., Cleveland State
University, in rendering this Commentary into final form is gratefully acknowledged.
- LL.B., Columbia University; Jur. D., Berlin Law School; Professor of Law, Cleveland
State University, College of Law.
I An outstanding example of a casebook which sets forth some comparisons is R. FIELD
& B. KAPLAN, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 228-35 (3d ed. 1973),
in which the authors provide a comparison between civil law and common law systems
of civil procedure.
2 The American civil procedure system did not always have the purpose of giving
notice. Historically, the emphasis in pleading was upon "issue formulating" at common
law, changing to the emphasis upon "stating the material, ultimate facts," under the
codes. C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADINc 3-4, 56-7 (2d ed. 1947).
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nials. More elaborate pretrial statements frequently follow our brief
forms of pleading.
Use of the contrary civil law forms will highlight our precepts, and stu-
dents will better understand the merits of our adversary system.
Finally, the use of different civil law concepts will illuminate some
general policy considerations of our system which pertain, for example,
to the proper relationship between the attorney and prospective wit-
nesses, and to difficult questions of legal aid as they relate to court costs
and attorneys' fees.
I. DON'T PLEAD EVIDENCE
Every teacher of civil procedure has repeated the slogan that parties
do not need to plead evidence in a complaint;3 for example, we do not
list the names of witnesses in the complaint or describe in detail the
contents of letters seeking to prove a point. The official forms attached
to the Federal Rules or to the Ohio Civil Rules bear out this point.4 A
comparison with foreign examples shows how this teaching is actually
disobeyed in civil law systems. In a West German book of collected
pleadings the following statement appears in a complaint for the pay-
ment of rent:
PROOF: Testimony of the wife of the plaintiff, Mrs. Fredericke
Heimig, to be subpoenaed at the home of the plaintiff.
5
Or, in an Italian form, plaintiff in his contract complaint offered
documents which were filed in the clerk's office, and persons were of-
fered as witnesses on a specific issue if testimony should be required. 6
3 See, e.g., SEC v. Universal Serv. Ass'n, 106 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1939), cert. denied,
308 U.S. 622 (1940); Sierocinski v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 103 F.2d 843 (3d Cir.
1939); Ketcher v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 115 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Ark. 1953);
Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 37 F.Supp. 728 (W.D. Ky.
1941).
1 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. app. (Form 9); OHIO R. Civ. P. app. (Form 8).
5 Schopp, Aktenstiicke zur Ausbildung, Zivilprozess [Files for Education, Civil Pro-
cedure], Complaint in the matter of Heimig v. Dentig at 3, in ASCHENDORFF'S JunIs-
TISCHE HANDE1OCHEREI (1968)(as translated). Another example of this practice can be
found in W. BENHARDT, GanR, iss DER Ziviu'nozassncarrs [BASic ELEMENTS OF THE
LAW OF CIVIL Procedure] 202 (2d ed. 1951) (as translated):
It is true that the defendant on October 1, 1950 purchased the automobile from
the plaintiff. The price was to be paid on January 1, 1951. However, in the be-
ginning of December 1950 plaintiff, upon the request of defendant, agreed to a
postponement of the due date of the purchase price until April 1, 1951.
Proof:
(a) Merchant Friedrich Schulze,
Munich, 5 Belgradstreet,
witness.
(b) examination of the party.
The statement was in part, as follows: "Copies of three letters written by the plain-
tiff to the defendant, one of which by registered mail, return receipt requested." M.
CAPPALLE & J. PEMILLO, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ITALY 428 (1965).
A more complete excerpt from the complaint, showing in detail the documentary
and testimonial evidence which is set forth in the complaint form, is as follows:
The attorney, Bianco Bianchi, as the representative . . . Invites Mr. Rosso Rossi
to make an appearance at the time in the manner provided by article 166 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, with the warning that if he does not appear, he will be
[Vol. 25:423
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In a Swiss formbook setting forth many examples of complaints, a sam-
ple of a social insurance claim evidences the manner in which, in addi-
tion to evidentiary matters of a factual nature, legal points and their
"proof" by secondary authorities are advanced in a complaint. This
excerpt demonstrates the wide use of textbooks, sometimes even in
preference to court decisions, in the civil law practice:
Plaintiff is insured with the defendant, even though his employer
has failed to report him as insured and has not paid any insur-
ance premiums for him. Plaintiff's insurance, as an employee,
is independent of the actions of the employer. See Gepko and
Schlatter, Textbook on Accident Insurance, pages 42 and 44; W.
Lauber, The Practice of the Accident Insurance Courts, pages
49, 104, 174; Giorgio and Nabholz, The Obligatory Swiss Ac-
cident Insurance, pages 1, 4-6, 26, 33-46, 52, 134, 215. EEV
[Decisions of the Federal Insurance Court] 1928, pages 12, 26;
1929, p. 100; 1930, p. 79.7
In the margin there is set forth a more complete excerpt of the complaint
showing the extensive manner in which documents, witnesses, and par-
ties' testimony are listed as items of proof.'
proceeded against in contumacia, and to appear at the hearing of December 3,
1963, before the examining judge who will be designated by the President of the
Tribunal; and
Offers the following documents, filed in the clerk's office:
(1) Contract entered into between the parties on August 10, 1962 (doc. 1);
(2) Copies of three letters written by the plaintiff to the defendant, one of
which by registered mail, return receipt requested (docs. 2-4);
(3) The return receipt of the registered letter mentioned in (2) above (doc.
5); and
Asks that, if it be necessary, testimony be taken as to the following issues:
(a) If it be true that Mr. Andre Andrax and his wife were unable to live in the
villa owned by them, located at 158 Via del Vescovo, until July 10, 1963, because
of a lack of furnishings. (The following are indicated as witnesses:
Mr. Verde Verdi, residing at 119 Via S. Niccolo, Florence;
Mr. Nero Ned, residing at 256 Via del Paradiso, Florence);
(b) If it be true that Mr. Andrax and his wife from January 10, 1963 to
July 10, 1963, for lack of a place tolive in Italy had to stay at the Hotel Belgique
at a daily rate of 10,000 Lire. (The followin are indicated as witnesses:
M r .... );
(c) If it betrue that the furnishing of the villa was undertaken by another
furnisher on July 10, 1963, at a cost of 8,000,000 Lire, which was the market
price at the time. (The following are indicated as witnesses:
Mr....
Id.
Compare this with the brevity of a promissory note complaint in FED. R. Civ. P. app.
(Form 3); Otno R. Civ. P. app. (Form 2), and of a contract complaint in 2 S. JACOBY, OHIO
CIVIL PRACTICE UNDER THE RuLEs, Form 8.301 (1970).
1 R. ZINGG, HANDBUCH FUR RECHTSANWXLTE DER SCHWEIZ WEINFELDEN (MANUAL FOR
ArFORNEYS OF SWITZERLAND] 153 (1934) (as translated).
8On plaintiff suffered an accident. A stone weighing over 50
pounds fell out of a wheelbarrow which plaintiff pushed in front of himself on the
street, and the stone fell because worker X.Z. on a cross-road pushed his wheel-
barrow against the stone, with the result that the stone suddenly fell on the feet
of plaintiff.
Proof: Documents:
Statements in the investigatory file of the defendant against plaintiff, docu-
ment no.
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II. AvEnMENS TO BE SIMPLE, CONCISE, AND DIRECT.
No TECHNICAL FORMs OF PLEADINGS
The idea of simplicity and conciseness permeates our modem civil
procedure. Not only is the lack of formality different from our own tra-
dition,9 but also the greater freedom of modern pleading ("a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to re-
lief' 10 ) makes traditional requirements inapplicable. Civil law ex-
amples again show, by way of comparison, what imprecise and prolix
pleading can amount to. For instance, in the German book mentioned
above in the complaint for payment of rent the detailed descriptive
statement occurs: "When the defendant in 1950 or 1951 had to leave
his apartment, because his landlord needed the apartment himself,
plaintiff upon the request of his late wife offered to get him an apartment
in his 'Kotterhaus' built in 1813.""
Plaintiff suffered severe bruises. He was fully disabled from - to
_ _ 50% disabled from - to , and after
he is supposed to become fully able to work, without any remaining disability.
Proof: I. Documents:
1. Medical statement of Dr. med. XX. in accident file, page no. 10
2. Needed statement by Dr. med. J.K. in acbident file, page no. 13
3. Medical expert opinion by Dr. med. K.K. in accident file, page
no. 30
I. Interrogation of plaintiff
On plaintiff began to participate in a "repeater course," and
on - returned (after 14 days). During this period he felt no pains
and was not for a single day in the sickroom.
Proof: I. Documents:
1. Worksheet of plaintiff, page
II. Witnesses (comrades in the same group as plaintiff)
1. F.F. in
2. G.G. in
3. H.H. in
On , thus eight days after discharge from the "repeater course"
plaintiff felt such serious pains that he had to discontinue the work and had to
be examined by Dr. med. C.C. in - . The latter ascertained that the
bruise, which had been deemed to have been healed, was not as yet fully healed.
Reference is made to the investigatory file, appendix 35.
Proof: Documents:
Appendix 35 to above-mentioned investigatory file.
id.
9 See, e.g., evidencing the traditional formality: Rhodes v. Sewell, 21 Ala. App. 441,
109 So. 179 (1926) (despite filing by plaintiff of an attachment affidavit and a bond, the
proceeding before the court was held to be coram non judice and void because the re-
quired complaint was not filed); New Haven Sand Blast Co. v. Dreisback, 104 Conn. 322,
133 A. 99 (1926) (even stipulation of the parties held not to dispense with the require-
ment of written pleadings); Munday v. Vail, 34 N.J.L. 418 (1871) (issue not called in
question cannot be decided by court).
10 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Redundant or immaterial matter may be stricken. FED.
R. Civ. P. 12(f).
1 For instance, Ohio traditionally considered insufficient a simple charge that defen-
dant "negligently and carelessly operated and handled its said locomotive" because it did
not give notice of what acts would be attempted to be proved. New York, C & St. L. R.R.
v. Kistler, 66 Ohio St. 326, 333, 64 N.E. 130, 132 (1902). With the adoption in 1970 of
the Ohio Civil Rules, modelled after the Federal Rules, the Kistler allegation would now
be sufficient. See OHIo R. Civ. P. app. (Form 8), which is the equivalant of FED. R. Civ.
P. app. (Form 9); 1 S. JAcOBY, OHIO CIVIL PRACrICE UNDER THE Ruus 63 (1970).
12 Schopp, supra note 5, Complaint in the matter of Heimig v. Dentig at 2.
The full impact of the long-winded statement is shown by the more complete text of
the attorney's "reasoning" appearing in the complaint: 4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol25/iss4/2
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Or, in a French form of a complaint for damages for encroachment,
one of the typically French "whereas" clauses reads:
Whereas Mrs. Riviere is the owner of a building, located at
Paris, 3 Boulevard Roses, which she inherited from Mr. Rivi~re,
her predecessor in title, who had acquired the property by a
notarial instrument drawn by Mr. Merlin, notary, the second of
June 1895, and had built the building which stands there now.'
3
III. ARGUMENTATIVE DENIALS SHOULD BE AVOIDED
This admonition is firmly established in American civil procedure.
For instance, early cases under the Federal Rules held that verbose and
argumentative matters should not be contained in an answer. Such
material may be stricken by the court sua sponte. 14  The possible ver-
bosity of answers is dramatically shown by civil law examples. Exten-
sive historical facts are set forth in an answer provided in a German
book.1 5 For example, among others, the following statement occurs:
Plaintiff, who was born in 1890, shortly after World War I had
Reasoning:
The defendant is the son of the late first wife of the plaintiff. The latter is the
owner of the house in which the parties live. When the defendant in 1950 or
1951 had to leave his apartment, because his then landlord needed the apartment
himself, plaintiff, upon the requests of his late wife offered to get him an apart-
ment in his "Kotterhaus" built in 1813. The necessary capital was furnished by
taking up a mortgage of DM 12,000, at a savings bank. In lieu of paying rent the
defendant was to pay the interest and the amortization of the mortgage.
This was done until August 13, 1965. On August 15, 1965, plaintiff was
able to sell a part of the land which belonged to the Kotten. Accordingly, he was
able to pay the remaining portion of the mortgage. When plaintiff now de-
manded that defendant pay to him (plaintiff) interest and amortization of DM
80--monthly, defendant claimed that out of his own resources he had also put
money into the renovation, and he contended to set-off the claim resulting from
these expenditures against the obligation to pay rent. Defendant contends that
in addition to the DM 12,000 obtained from the savings bank he used DM 13,000
for the work of renovation. This is impossible. He has been unable to specify
this DM 12,000 and the labor was done without cost, by means of the recipro-
cal assistance of both parties in the course of their family co-operation.
In view of the fact that for a long period defendant has not paid rent, plain-
tiff has terminated the lease on May 15, 1966 without a grace period.
So that defendant would not be thrown onto the street, plaintiff let him live
in the apartment, after the parties had agreed to an increase in rent to DM 160.
monthly, beginning June 1, 1966.
Proof: Testimony of the wife of the plaintiff, Mrs. Fredericke Heimig, to be
subpoenaed at the home of the plaintiff.
Suit was brought because, despite repeated reminders, defendant has not
paid. The right to terminate again without grace period and to secure eviction
is reserved, if again defendant fails to pay the full rent punctually.
Id. at 2-3.
Compare this elaborate form with the succinct forms appearing in American form-
books for complaints for payment of rent due. See, e.g., S. JACOBY, supra note 6, at
Form 8.707.
13 P. HERZOC, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 650 (1967).
14 Strahle-Johnson Supply Co. v. John Douglas Co., 1 F.R.D. 279 (E.D. Tenn. 1940);
Hindleman v. Specialty Salesman Magazine, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 272 (N.D. IIl. 1940).
15 We, of course, do not plead facts in answers. For a discussion of the civil law
practice of pleading facts, see notes 3-8 and accompanying text, supra.
1976]
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married the mother of defendant, whose father, - after approxi-
mately two years of marriage - had been killed in the year 1914.
The marriage of plaintiff with the mother of defendant, also
produced only one child. This stepbrother of defendant did
not return from World War II. He is a missing person, but so
far has not been declared dead.16
Similarly, a certain portion of a French example is sufficient to
demonstrate the argumentative, verbose character of an answer:
Whereas the expert has stated in his report:
' The fences enclosing the front yards were built in accor-
dance with the specifications, without regard to whether the
length of the frontage, under the contract of sale, actually was
17 meter and 22.57 meter. The fence on the side of the prop-
erties enclosing the front yard dates from the same period,
1877.
"This is shown by its nature, its looks, and its old appear-
ance.
"Since fences were put along the frontage of No. 1 and No. 3,
and on a small part of the side of the property, as indicated
above, the strip of land of 1 meter width was thus closed off
against the street, and, as it were, landlocked.."1 7
In addition to being argumentative, defendant's answer in an Italian
proceeding shows its hypothetical character:
In the event that this tribunal does not deny plaintiff's
prayer for relief on the ground just stated, the defendant also
states that, about two weeks after the contract between plaintiff
and defendant was concluded, there occurred a sudden, extra-
ordinary, and unforeseeable rise of 25% in the market price of
the goods contracted for, making performance of the contract
pursuant to its terms excessively burdensome to the de-
fendant.1 8
IV. Couirr DECISIONS ORDERING THE TAKING OF PRooF
The further development of litigation in the civil law world shows
the purpose of the "pleading of evidence." Evidence is taken by and
pursuant to orders of the court. The "plea of evidence" enables the
court to formulate a "Decree of Proof" setting forth the name of the
witness who shall be heard and on what issue.
In a German formbook the following Decree of Proof is set forth:
,6 Schopp, supra note 5, Answer in the matter of Heimig v. Den tig at 2.
11 P. HERZOC, supra note 13, at 664.
IS M. CAPPELLETT1 & J. PERILLO, supra note 6, at 430-33.
[Vol. 25:423
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March 12, 1951
Thereupon, the following
Decree of Proof
is issued:
Upon the application of the defendant, the merchant Fried-
rich Schulze, Munich, 5 Belgradstreet, shall be heard as a wit-
ness on the defense of the defendant that the plaintiff in Decem-
ber 1950 agreed to a postponement of the due date of the
purchase price of the automobile until April 1, 1951.
March 19, 1951, 9 A.M. is set for the taking of the testi-
mony and for resumption of the oral hearing.
The witness will be ordered to appear only if defendant un-
til March 14, 1951, will have paid DM 5. - to the registry of
the District Court as advance for the expense."19
This Decree of Proof was executed a week later (showing the "piece-
meal" character of civil litigation), as follows:
March 19, 1951
As a witness: the merchant Schulze.
After the witness was admonished to say the truth and the
importance of the oath was called to his attention, he was exam-
ined and testified, as follows:
"My name is Friedrich Schulze, I am a merchant, 40 years,
and related to neither party.
"I know both parties. In the beginning of December we
were together in a restaurant. We talked about the present
difficult financial situation. Mr. Becker's debt of the purchase
price was not mentioned at all. I know nothing of a postpone-
ment to April 1, 1951. '"20
x W. BERNHARDT, supra note 5, at 204-05.
20 Id. The following is another example of an execution of a Decree of Proof, this
time in an Italian court:
The first witness adduced by the defendant is introduced and warned by the
examining judge of the religious and moral importance of the oath and the penal
consequences of false or reticent statements; then the examining judge invites
him to take the oath and reads the formula: "Conscious of the responsibility which
by the oath you assume before God and men, swear to tell the truth, nothing but
the truth." The witness standing, says the words: "I so swear." Interrogated
on his identification, he answers: "I am Mirto Mirti, born in Siena on August 15,
1941, residing at 327 Piazza del Limbo, Florence, and a clerk in the store of
Rosso Rossi."
At the request of the judge, the witness states that he is not related by blood
or marriage to either of the parties, and, although he is employed by the defen-
dant as a clerk, he is not interested in the case.
The attorney for the plaintiff alleges that the witness' testimony is suspect
because of his employment by the defendant.
The judge, taking note of the aforesaid, questions the witness on the items of
proof. On the first item formulated in the defendant's answer, he replies: "It is
true. I was present when Mr. Andrac and Mr. Rossi made their agreement."
On the second item, he states: "I cannot, in good conscience, give a precise
answer." Upon questioning by the judge, he clarifies his answer by stating: "I
was busy in the store with another customer and, although I heard generally
what was said, I didn't hear all the specific details. The only thing on the point
I can state with certainty is that, soon after Mr. Andrac left, I heard Mr. Rossi
19176]
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Then, on the same date, a second Decree of Proof was issued:
Thereupon the following
Decree of Proof
is issued:
Upon the application of the defendant, plaintiff shall be ex-
amined before the Court on March 26, 1951, 9 A.M. on defen-
dant's allegation that he obtained a postponement of due date
of the purchase price.2'
The significance of the Decrees of Proof for the attorneys of the
parties is shown by the following Swiss example. In the civil law world,
the attorneys do not present their cases but by means of suggesting
Decrees of Proof and, i necessary, their changes, they seek to influ-
ence the conduct of the litigation. The Swiss example shows how a party
sought to have the court modify the Decree of Proof:
Application to Modify the Order of Proof
To cancel the order of proof of . . . and to impose the bur-
den of proof on the defendant, that he issued the note of . . .
without a proper basic consideration (causa) ...
(3) Accordingly, it is not the duty of the plaintiff to prove
the consideration of the debt, but it is the task of defendant to
prove the non-existence of a consideration for the debt. Fick,
Note 6 to Art. 17, Code of Obligations, Oser, Note IV 1(b),
(d) to Art. 17, Code of Obligations.
4. From a procedural point of view, an order of proof may
be modified at any time, section 169, ZUrich Code of Civil Pro-
cedure. Plaintiff has shown that it is proper to distribute the
burden of proof differently, and the Judge should reconsider his
order and should issue a new order of proof.2
V. SOME ADDITIONAL LESSONS
In their recent book, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis,
John Thibaut and Laurens Walker discussed some "cross-national com-
parisons" between the "Adversaries versus Inquisitors" and stated that
the relative merits of dispute resolution procedures are most often articu-
lated "by legal theorists." 2 3 Our references to procedural forms do not
give merely the views of legal theorists; they show the practical im-
plications of the systems.
and Miss Rosalie speak of the fact that the client had agreed to pay one-half of
the price within a week."
There being no further questions to put to the witness, he is released after
the reading to and confirmation and signature by, him of this verbale.
Read, confirmed, and signed.
M. CAPPELLETTI & J. PERILLO, supra note 6, at 436.
21 W. BERNHARDT, supra note 5, at 205.
22 R. ZINcc, supra note 7 at 216-17.
23 J. THIrAUTr & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 22
(1975).
[Vol. 25:4Z3
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A. Single-Day-in-Court System
Our discussion2 4 has illustrated the practical significance of an ab-
sence of a "single-day-in-court" system. This fact can be used when an
attempt is made in American law to show the meaning of certain meth-
ods. For instance, when discussing the procedure before the trial
judges of the United States Court of Claims, it should be noted that
that procedure is not fully governed by the maxim of a "one-day-
court" proceeding, but permits piece-meal trial;25 to a slight extent, it
is similar to the civil law system. It is interesting to observe that in
some respects the discovery proceedings before the Court of Claims are
less advanced than the regular district court proceedings,2 6 and, again,
to compare this with the fact that discovery proceedings are rather un-
known in the typical civil law system.
27
B. Execution of Decree of Proof
The practical examples showing the execution of decrees of proof in
the civil law world2 s explain why, in view of the simple paraphrase of
the witness' testimony and its non-verbatim report, it was necessary in
1963 to add the last sentence to Rule 28(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. This sentence concerns the taking of depositions in foreign
countries pursuant to a letter rogatory for use in American litigation:
"Evidence obtained in response to a letter rogatory need not be ex-
cluded merely for the reason that it is not a verbatim transcript or that
the testimony was not taken under oath .. "
C. Attorney-Client Relationship
The execution of the Decree of Proof, quoted above 29 shows that a
witness named by a party testified that he did not know anything about
the matter. This highlights the principle, existing in some civil law
countries, that it is unethical for a lawyer to discuss the facts of a case
with a prospective witness. 30 This practice can be usefully discussed in
comparison with our contrary practice.
D. Payment of Court Fees by Poor Litigants
The Decree of Proof, quoted above,3 1 required the party to pay to
the registry of the court DM 5 - as an advance of the expense of the
court calling the witness. This monetary requirement furnishes a perfect
24 See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
2 FED. R. CT. CL. 132(b); 2 WEST'S FEDERAL PRACrIcE MANUAL § 1922 (2d ed. 1970).
26 See 2 WEST'S FEDERAL PRACrICE MANUAL § 1913 (2d ed. 1970).
27 See Jacoby, Das Erforschungsverfahren im amerikanischen Zivilprozess; Vorschlfi-
ge fiir eine Reform der ZPO, 74 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR ZIVILPROZESS 145 (1961).
28 See notes 19-22 and accompanying text, supra.
29 See note 20 and accompanying text, supra.
30 See R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 307 (3d ed. 1970).
31 See note 19 and accompanying text, supra.
1976]
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vehicle for a discussion of the all-important problem of legal aid to the
poor civil litigant in the western world. It was in this connection that
many years ago the Swiss Supreme Court, in the exercise of its power
to declare cantonal, but not federal, statutes unconstitutional, 32 held
invalid under the constitutional equality principle3 a cantonal stat-
ute, when applied to a poor person, which required a party to make such
small payments.34 The language of the Swiss Court seems interesting.
Thus, the Court declared:
Article 4 of the federal constitution, viz., the principle of
equality of the law, includes the equal right of all citizens to
recei-e legal protection by the state for a civil claim alleged by
them. . . . This right would not be preserved if in the case of
poor persons the actions of the court or the performance of cer-
tain procedural acts were made dependent upon prior payment
of court costs or expenses. Such regulation constitutes equal
treatment of the citizens only in a superficial, apparent manner.
Actually, poor persons are refused legal protection for the pros-
ecution of a well founded or, at least, not hopeless claim, be-
cause a condition is attached which the respective person is a
limine unable to fulfill. This amounts to an unconstitutional
discrimination of poor parties in a litigation as against wealthy
ones .... 35
The Court added:
The principle of equality . . .constitutes a barrier not only
for the branches of the government applying the laws, but also
for the legislator. This holds true also with regard to subjects
in which the law-making power in principle remains with the
cantons. Such constitutional right, therefore, cannot be denied
on the ground that the legislative competence of the cantons in
the fields of court organization, court procedure, and judiciary,
would be infringed upon.3 6
The equality principle was broadly applied. For instance, it was held
that in a civil litigation, payment of appeal costs may not be demanded
of poor persons, whether or not they have applied for legal aid in the
trial before the lower court, unless clearly no appeal lies in the case or
unless the appeal obviously has no chance of success.37
Comparing these broad constitutional principles with the hesitant
32 As to this power see Jacoby, Delegation of Powers and judicial Review: A Study
in Comparative Law, 36 CoLum. L. REv. 871, 896 (1936).
S"All Swiss are equal before the law." (Article 4 of the Constitution), quoted in
C. HUcHES, THE FEDERAL CoNs=rIoN OF SWrrzERLAND 6 (2d ed. 1970).
31 Hocker v. Obergericht Aargau, 57 BGE 1 337 (1931).
35 Id. at 343 (as translated).
38 Id.
r' Weiss v. Crauwiler, 60 BGE I 179 (1934). For a discussion of various problems of
civil legal aid in many countries, on a comparative basis, see Jacoby, Legal Aid to the
Poor, 53 HARV. L. REv. 940 (1940).
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constitutional steps we have taken in the field of court costs of civil
litigation, might be a stimulating endeavor. Cases such as Boddie v.
Connecticut,38 United States v. Kras39 and Ortwein v. Schwab40
can be compared, and they can show how limited our constitutional
protections are. It is true that in Boddie female welfare recipients seek-
ing divorces were held, on the basis of due process,41 to be free from
the payment of court costs. However, in the unfortunate decision in
Kras a voluntary bankrupt was held to be required to prepay the filing
fee provided by the Bankruptcy Act, and in the equally unfortunate
decision in Ortwein, it was held that indigents had to pay the twenty-
five dollar appellate court filing fee required for judicial review of un-
favorable agency decisions concerning their public assistance. Compara-
tive law might help in rethinking the problems.
In conclusion, it would seem that a study of comparative civil pro-
cedure could assist in the examination of specific rules of American
civil procedure and in the weighing of general policy problems.
401 U.S. 371 (1971).
a 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
40 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
41 Only the separate concurring opinions of Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Bren-
nan predicated the result on the equal protection clause. 401 U.S. at 383-89.
1976)
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1976
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol25/iss4/2
